Post by Andrei Tchentchik on Apr 25, 2020 9:48:35 GMT 2
(.#431).- Documents UFOs of the C.I.A for Sept. and Oct. 1952, uncensored.
Sample of documents related to UFOs of the C.I.A for 1952, uncensored.
SECURITY INFORMATION
11 Sept. 1952
MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence
THRU : Deputy Director (Intelligence)
SUBJECT: Flying Saucers
1. PROBLEM
To determine :
a. Whether there are national security implications in the problem of "unidentified
flying objects" i.e. flying saucers;
b. Whether adequate study and research is currently being directed to this problem
in its relation to such national security implications; and
c. What further investigation and research should be instituted, by whom, and under
what aegis.
2. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
a. OSI has investigated the work currently being performed on flying
saucers and has found that :
(1) The only unit of government currently studying the problem is the Directorate
of intelligence, USAF, which has charged the Air Technical Intelligence Center (ATIC) with responsibility for investigating the reports of sightings.
(2) At ATIC there is a small group consisting of a reserve Captain, two Lieutenants
and two secretaries to which come all reports of sighting through official channels, and which conducts investigation of the reports either itself or through consultation with other Air Force officers or with civilian technical consultants.
(3) A world-wide reporting system has been instituted and major Air Force bases
have been ordered to make interceptions of unidentified flying objects.
(4) The research being carried on as strictly on a case basis and appears to be
designed solely to attempt a satisfactory explanation of each individual sighting as it occurs.
(5) ATIC has concluded an arrangement with Battelle Memorial Institute for the
latter to establish a machine indexing system for official reports of sightings.
(6) Since 1947, ATIC has received approximately 1500 official reports of sightings
plus an enormous volume of letters, phone calls and press reports. During the month of July 1952 alone, official reports totaled 250. Of the 1500 reports, Air Force carries 20% as unexplained and of those received January through July 1952 it carries 26% unexplained.
3. DISCUSSION
a. OSI entered into its inquiry fully aware that it was coming into a field already charged with partisanship, one in which objectivity had been overridden by numerous sensational writers, and one in which there are pressures for extravagant explanations as well as for oversimplification. The OSI Team consulted with a representative of Air Force Special Studies Group; discussed the problem with those in charge of the Air Force Project at Wright field; reviewed a considerable volume of intelligence reports; checked the Soviet press and broadcast indices; and conferred with three OSI consultants, all leaders in their scientific fields, who were chosen because of their broad knowledge of the technical areas concerned.
b. OSI found that the ATIC study is probably valid if the purpose is limited to a case-by-case explanation. However, the study makes no attempt to solve the more fundamental aspect of the problem which is to determine definitely the nature of the various phenomena which are causing these sightings, or to discover means by which these causes and their visual and electronic effects may be immediately identified. Our consultant panel stated that these solutions would probably be found on the margins or just beyond the frontiers of our present phenomena, with the added possibility that our present dispersal of nuclear waste products might also be a factor. The recommended that a study group be formed to perform three functions:
(1) Analyze and systematize the factors of information which form the fundamental problem ;
(2) Determine the fields of fundamental science which must be investigated in order to reach an understanding of the phenomena involved; and
(3) Make recommendations for the initiation of appropriate
research.
Dr. Julius A. Stratton, Vice President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has indicated to OSI that such a group could be constituted at that Institute. Similarly, Project Lincoln, the Air force air defense project at MIT, could be charged with these responsibilities.
4. CONCLUSION
a. The flying saucer situation contains two elements of danger which, in
a situation of international tension, have national security
implications.
These are :
(1) Psychological - With word-wide sightings reported, it was found that, up to the
time of our investigation, there had been in the Russian press no report or comment, even satirical, on flying saucers, though Andre Gromyko had made one humorous mention of the subject. With a State-controlled press, this could result only from an official policy decision. The question, therefore, arises as whether or not these sightings:
(a) Could be controlled,
(b) Could be predicted, and
(c) Could be used from a psychological warfare point of view either
offensively or defensively.
The public concern with the phenomena, which is reflected in the United States press and in pressure of inquiry upon the Air Force, indicates that there is a fair proportion of our population which is mentally conditioned to the acceptance of the incredible. In this fact lies the potential for the touching-off of mass hysteria and panic.
(2) Air Vulnerability - The United States Air Warning System will undoubtedly
always depend upon a combination of radar screening and visual observation. We give Russia the present capability of delivering an air attack against us, yet at any given moment now, there may be current a dozen official unidentified sightings plus many unofficial. At any moment of attack, we are now in a position where we cannot, on an instant basis, distinguish hardware from phantom, and as tension mounts we will run the increasing risk of false
alerts and the even greater danger of falsely identifying the real as phantom.
b. Both of these problems are primarily operational in nature but each contains readily apparent intelligence factors. From an operational point of view, three actions are required :
(1) Immediate steps should be taken to improve identification of both visual and
electronic phantom so that in the event of an attack, instant and positive identification of enemy planes or missiles can be made.
(2) A study should be instituted to determine what, if any, utilization could be made of these phenomena by United States psychological warfare planners, and what, if any, defenses should be planned in anticipation of Soviet attempts to utilize them.
(3) A national policy should be established as to what should be told the public regarding the phenomena, in order to minimize risk of panic.
c. Intelligence problems include :
(1) The present level of Russian knowledge regarding these phenomena
(2) Possible Soviet intentions and capabilities to utilize these phenomena to the
detriment of US security interests.
(3) The reasons for silence in the Soviet Press regarding flying saucers.
d. Intelligence responsibilities in this field as regards both collection
and analysis can be discharged with maximum effectiveness only
after much more is known regarding the exact nature of these
phenomena.
e. The problem transcends the level of individual departmental
responsibilities, and is of such importance as to merit cognizance
and action by the National Security Council.
f. Additional research, differing in character and emphasis from that
presently being performed by Air Force, will be required to meet the
specific needs of both operations and intelligence.
5. RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that :
a. The Director of Central Intelligence advise the National Security Council of the security implications inherent in the flying saucer problem with the request that, under his statutory coordinating authority, The Director of Central Intelligence be empowered to institute through the appropriate agencies, either within or without the government, the investigation and research necessary to solve the problem of instant positive identification of "unidentified flying objects".
b. CIA, under its assigned responsibilities, and in cooperation with the psychological strategy board immediately investigate possible offensive or defensive utilization of the phenomena for psychological warfare purposes both for and against the United States, advising those agencies charged with U.S. internal security of any pertinent findings affecting their areas of responsibility.
c. On the basis of these programs of research, CIA develop and recommend for adoption by the National Security Council a policy of public information which will minimize the risk of panic.
H. MARSHALL CHADWELL
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence
OSI PGStrong:bxd (11 September 1952)
((((((((((((((((((((0))))))))))))))))))))
SECURITY INFORMATION
Sept. 24 1952
MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director (Intelligence)
SUBJECT : Flying Saucers
1. Recently an inquiry was conducted by the Office of Scientific Intelligence to determine Whether there are national security implications in the problem of "unidentified flying objects", i.e., flying saucers; whether adequate study and research is currently being directed to this problem in its relation to such national security implications; and what further investigation and research should be instituted, by whom, and under what aegis.
2. It was found that the only unit of Government currently studying the problem is the Directorate of Intelligence, USAF, which has charged the Air Technical Intelligence Center (ATIC) with responsibility for investigating the reports of sightings. At ATIC there is a group of three officers and two secretaries to which come, through official channels, all reports of sightings. This group conducts investigation of the reports, consulting as required with other Air Force and civilian technical personnel. A world-wide reporting system has been instituted and major Air Force Bases have been ordered to make interceptions of unidentified flying objects. The research is being conducted on a case basis and is designed to provide a satisfactory explanation of each individual sighting. ATIC has concluded an arrangement with Battelle Memorial Institute for the latter to establish a machine indexing system for official reports of sightings.
3. Since 1947, ATIC has received approximately 1500 official reports of sightings plus an enormous volume of letters, phone calls and press reports. During July 1952 alone, official reports totaled 250. Of the 1500 reports, Air Force carries 20 percent as unexplained and of those received January through July 1952 it carries 26 percent unexplained.
4. In its inquiry into this problem, a team from CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence consulted with a representative of Air Force Special Studies Group; discussed the problem with those in charge of the Air Force Project at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base; reviewed a considerable volume of intelligence reports; checked the Soviet press and broadcast indices; and conferred with three CIA consultants, who have broad knowledge of the technical areas concerned.
5. It was found that the ATIC study is probably valid if the purpose is limited to a case-by-case explanation. However, that study does not solve the more fundamental aspect of the problem. These aspects are to determine definitely the nature of the various phenomena which are causing these sightings, or to discover means by which these causes and their visual or electronic effects, may be identified immediately. The CIA consultants stated that these solutions would probably be found on the margins or just beyond the frontiers of our present knowledge in the fields of atmospheric, ionospheric, and extraterrestrial phenomena, with the added possibility that our present dispersal of nuclear waste products might also be a factor. The recommended that a study group be formed to perform three functions:
(a) Analyze and systematize the factors which constitute the fundamental
problem;
(b) Determine the fields of fundamental science which must be investigated in
order to reach an understanding of the phenomena involved; and
(c) Make recommendations for the initiation of appropriate research.
Dr. Julius A. Stratton, Vice President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has indicated to CIA that such a group could be constituted at that Institute. Similarly, Project Lincoln, the Air Force's air defense project at MIT, could be charged with some of these responsibilities.
6. The flying saucer situation contains two elements of danger which, in a situation of international tension, have national security implications.
These are:
(a) Psychological - With world-wide sightings reported, it was found that, up to the
time of the investigation, there had been in the Soviet press no report or comment, even satirical, on flying saucers, though Gromyko had made one humorous mention of the subject. With a State-controlled press, this could result only from an official policy decision. The question, therefore, arises as whether or not these sightings:
(1) Could be controlled,
(2) Could be predicted, and
(3) Could be used from a psychological warfare point of view either offensively
or defensively.
The public concern with the phenomena, which is reflected both in the United States press and in the pressure of inquiry upon the Air Force, indicates that a fair proportion of our population is mentally conditioned to the acceptance of the incredible. In this fact lies the potential for the touching-off of mass hysteria and panic.
(b) Air Vulnerability - The United States Air Warning System will undoubtedly
always depend upon a combination of radar screening and visual observation. The U.S.S.R. is credited with the present capability of delivering an air attack against the United States, yet at any given moment now, there may be current a dozen official unidentified sightings plus many unofficial ones. At any moment of attack, we are now in a position where we cannot, on an instant basis, distinguish hardware from phantom, and as tension mounts we
will run the increasing risk of false alerts and the even greater danger of falsely
identifying the real as phantom.
7. Both of these problems are primarily operational in nature but each contains readily apparent intelligence factors.
8. From an operational point of view, three actions are required:
(a) Immediate steps should be taken to improve identification of both visual and
electronic phantom so that in the event of an attack, instant and positive identification of enemy planes or missiles can be made.
(b) A study should be instituted to determine what, if any, utilization could be
made of these phenomena by United States psychological warfare planners and what, if any, defenses should be planned in anticipation of Soviet attempts to utilize them.
(c) In order to minimize risk of panic, a national policy should be established as to
what should be told the public regarding the phenomena,
9. Other intelligence problems which require determination are:
(a) The present level of Soviet knowledge regarding these phenomena
(b) Possible Soviet intentions and capabilities to utilize these phenomena to the
detriment of the United States security interests.
(c) The reasons for silence in the Soviet Press regarding flying saucers.
10. Additional research, differing in character and emphasis from that presently being performed by Air Force, will be required to meet the specific needs of both operations and intelligence. Intelligence responsibilities in this field as regards both collection and analysis can be discharged with maximum effectiveness only after much more is known regarding the exact nature of these phenomena.
11. I consider this problem to be of such importance that it should be brought to the attention of the National Security Council in order that a community-wide coordinated effort towards its solution may be initiated.
/s/ HM Chadwell
H. MARSHALL CHADWELL
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence
((((((((((((((((((((0))))))))))))))))))))
SECURITY INFORMATION
Oct. 2 1952
MEMORANDUM TO: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director (Intelligence)
FROM : Assistant Director, Office of Scientific Intelligence
SUBJECT : Flying Saucers
1. PROBLEM - To determine: (a) Whether or not there are national security implications in the problem of "unidentified flying objects"; (b) Whether or not adequate study and research is currently being directed to this problem in its relation to such national security implications; and (c) What further investigation and research should be instituted, by whom, and under what aegis.
2. FACTS AND DISCUSSION - OSI has investigated the work currently being performed on "flying saucers" and found that the Air Technical Intelligence Center, DI, USAF, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, is the only group devoting appreciable effort and study to this subject, that ATIC is concentrating on a case-by-case explanation of each report, and that this effort is not adequate to correlate, evaluate, and resolve the situation on an overall basis. The current problem is discussed in detail in TAB A.
3. CONCLUSIONS - "Flying saucers" pose two elements of danger which have national security implications. The first involves mass psychological considerations and the second concerns the vulnerability of the United States to air attack. Both factors are amplified in TAB A.
4. ACTION RECOMMENDED - (a) That the Director of Central Intelligence advise the National Security Council of the implications of the "flying saucer" problem and request that research be initiated. TAB B is a draft memorandum to the NSC, for the DCI's signature. (b) That the DCI discuss this subject with the Psychological Strategy Board. A memorandum to the Director, Psychological Strategy Board, is attached for signature as TAB C. (c) That CIA, with the cooperation of PSB and other interested departments and agencies, develop and recommend for adoption by the NSC a policy of public information which will minimize concern and possible panic resulting from the numerous sightings of unidentified objects.
/s/ HM Chadwell
H. MARSHALL CHADWELL
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence
ANNEXES:
TAB A - Memorandum to DCI, through DDI, Subject: Flying Saucers.
TAB B - Letter to National Security Council with enclosure.
TAB C - Memo to Director, Psychological Strategy Board with enclosure.
CONCURRENCES:
Date: _________________ ______________________
LOFTUS E. BECKER
Deputy Director/Intelligence
ACTION BY APPROVING AUTHORITY:
Date: _________________
Approved (disapproved)
_____________________
WALTER B. SMITH
Director
((((((((((((((((((((0))))))))))))))))))))
SECURITY INFORMATION
13 Oct. 1952
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)
SUBJECT : Flying Saucers
1. Flying unidentified objects (Flying Saucers) have been the subject of Air Force investigation and analysis because of the possibility that such objects might conceivably be an attack on the U.S. If they are not, it is conceivable that the enemy might take advantage of the confusion created by the [by the] Flying Saucers to use at his convenience some air weapon against the United States.
2. Thus far Defense Department conducted research in this area has been confined to the effort by A-2 through ATIC with the result that an explanation has been provided on all but 20 per cent of the total 1500 reported sightings of Flying Saucers.
3. Determination of the scientific capabilities of the USSR to create and control Flying Saucers as a weapon against the United States is a primary concern of the CIA/OSI. Its review of existing information does not lead to the conclusion that the saucers are USSR created or controlled. It is the view of OSI that collection of intelligence information on the capabilities of the USSR to produce, launch, and control Flying Saucers and the analysis of such data as might be collected cannot be very effective until there is adequate fundamental scientific research launched to clarify the nature and causes of Flying Saucers and to devise means whereby they might be instantly identified.
4. The major scientific intelligence problems in respect to saucers are:
a. What is the present level of Soviet knowledge regarding these phenomena?
b. What are possible Soviet capabilities to utilize these phenomena to the detriment of US security interests?
c. What effect do flying saucers have on our warning system.
5. Conclusions:
a. The instigation of fundamental scientific research is the primary responsibility of
the Defense Department.
{, after IAC,} {(alternatively: The NSC)}
b. The DCI ^ should dispatch to Secretary Lovett ^ along the lines of the attached.
The cover sheet explaining to the IAC why the proposed letter is submitted is also attached {(We showed
this draft & the idea with A-2 before IAC)}
c. It is far too early in view of the present state of our knowledge regarding Flying
Saucers for psychological warfare planners to start planning how the United States might use U.S. Flying Saucers against the enemy.
d. When intelligence has submitted the National Estimate on Flying Saucers there
will be the time and basis for a public policy to reduce or restrain mass hysteria.
/s/ James Q. Reber
JAMES Q. REBER
Assistant Director
Intelligence Coordination
((((((((((((((((((((0))))))))))))))))))))
SECURITY INFORMATION
DRAFT COVER SHEET
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Flying Unidentified Objects (Flying Saucers)
{(Alternatively: The NSC)}
1. Attached is proposed letter to Secretary Lovett ^ from the DCI recommending the initiation of fundamental scientific research with respect to the nature and causes of unidentified flying objects (Flying Saucers).
2. While it is recognized that the implications of Flying Saucers are of primary concern to the Defense Department in carrying out its responsibility to defend the United States, it is also believed that intelligence must request of appropriate authority such assistance as it needs to carry out its responsibility. It is believed that the scientific research required and the intelligence research contingent thereon can be most fruitful if they go hand in hand.
3. Recommendations:
a. That the IAC concur in the proposed letter to the secretary of Defense.
b. That the IAC request the Watch Committee to give close attention to indications which may reflect Russian actions are being taken with respect to or on the basis of cognizance of Flying Saucers or with respect to the state of United States public opinion in respect of Flying saucers.
((((((((((((((((((((0))))))))))))))))))))
SECURITY INFORMATION
DRAFT LETTER
MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of Defense {(Alternatively: The NSC)}
SUBJECT: Unidentified Flying Objects (Flying Saucers)
1. The IAC has reviewed the current situation concerning unidentified flying objects which have caused extensive speculation in the press and have been the subject of concern to Government organizations. The Air Force, within the limitations of manpower which could be devoted to the subject, has thus far carried the full responsibility for investigating and analyzing individual reports of sightings. Since 1947, approximately 1500 official reports of sightings have been received and, of these, about 20% are as yet unexplained.
2. It is my view and that of the IAC that this situation has possible implications for our national security with respect to the vulnerability of the U.S. to air attack. Intelligence, however, cannot discharge its responsibilities with regard to estimating the capabilities of an enemy to create and use such phenomena against the U.S. unless we first determine through scientific research whether or not such phenomena can in fact be generated and controlled by humans.
3. It is therefore recommended, that the Department of Defense {(be directed to)} undertake an expanded scientific research program to reveal the nature of the various phenomena which are causing these sightings and means by which these phenomena may be identified immediately. It is also recommended that in such a project there be close cooperation between those conducting research and scientific and technical intelligence research. The IAC agencies are prepared to do their part in such a project.
4. It is therefore recommended, that this Agency and the agencies of the Department of Defense be directed to formulate and carry out a program of intelligence and research activities required to solve the problem of instant positive identification of unidentified flying objects. A draft of an appropriate directive is attached.
{DCI}
((((((((((((((((((((0))))))))))))))))))))
SECURITY INFORMATION
14 October 1952
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Flying Saucers Problem
1. At an informal discussion between DD/I, AD/IC, and Acting AD/SI, it was agreed that the saucer problem should be attacked by getting together the responsible individuals in the community to work out a program of research and intelligence which can then be implemented by them directly. The agreed program can then be forwarded to the DCI and possibly the Secretary of Defense and the balance of the National Security Council as an established program rather than waiting for a great deal of formal, high level paper pushing before taking action.
2. DD/I directed Acting AD/SI to contact Dr. Whitman and Gen. Samford to arrange an appropriate time at which this problem can be reviewed. Acting AD/SI to call on Dr. Whitman and review the background of our study before the meeting.
3. Subsequently, Acting AD/SI was advised that the most convenient days for this meeting would be Monday or Tuesday, 20 or 21 October. Those present would be:
Dr. Walter G. Whitman, Chairman, RDB
Gen. John A. Samford, Director of Intelligence, USAF
Mr. Loftus E. Becker, DD/I
Mr. James Q. Reber, AD/IC
plus others deemed appropriate by the principals.
/s/ Ralph L. Clark
RALPH L. CLARK
CC: Chief, Opns/SI - 1
Chief, SAD/SI - 1
Chief, Prod/SI - 1
{22 aug request}
{L 141}
Suite… (.#432).- Documents UFOs of the C.I.A for Sept. and Oct. 1952, uncensored.
((((((((((((((((((((0))))))))))))))))))))
Sample of documents related to UFOs of the C.I.A for 1952, uncensored.
SECURITY INFORMATION
11 Sept. 1952
MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence
THRU : Deputy Director (Intelligence)
SUBJECT: Flying Saucers
1. PROBLEM
To determine :
a. Whether there are national security implications in the problem of "unidentified
flying objects" i.e. flying saucers;
b. Whether adequate study and research is currently being directed to this problem
in its relation to such national security implications; and
c. What further investigation and research should be instituted, by whom, and under
what aegis.
2. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
a. OSI has investigated the work currently being performed on flying
saucers and has found that :
(1) The only unit of government currently studying the problem is the Directorate
of intelligence, USAF, which has charged the Air Technical Intelligence Center (ATIC) with responsibility for investigating the reports of sightings.
(2) At ATIC there is a small group consisting of a reserve Captain, two Lieutenants
and two secretaries to which come all reports of sighting through official channels, and which conducts investigation of the reports either itself or through consultation with other Air Force officers or with civilian technical consultants.
(3) A world-wide reporting system has been instituted and major Air Force bases
have been ordered to make interceptions of unidentified flying objects.
(4) The research being carried on as strictly on a case basis and appears to be
designed solely to attempt a satisfactory explanation of each individual sighting as it occurs.
(5) ATIC has concluded an arrangement with Battelle Memorial Institute for the
latter to establish a machine indexing system for official reports of sightings.
(6) Since 1947, ATIC has received approximately 1500 official reports of sightings
plus an enormous volume of letters, phone calls and press reports. During the month of July 1952 alone, official reports totaled 250. Of the 1500 reports, Air Force carries 20% as unexplained and of those received January through July 1952 it carries 26% unexplained.
3. DISCUSSION
a. OSI entered into its inquiry fully aware that it was coming into a field already charged with partisanship, one in which objectivity had been overridden by numerous sensational writers, and one in which there are pressures for extravagant explanations as well as for oversimplification. The OSI Team consulted with a representative of Air Force Special Studies Group; discussed the problem with those in charge of the Air Force Project at Wright field; reviewed a considerable volume of intelligence reports; checked the Soviet press and broadcast indices; and conferred with three OSI consultants, all leaders in their scientific fields, who were chosen because of their broad knowledge of the technical areas concerned.
b. OSI found that the ATIC study is probably valid if the purpose is limited to a case-by-case explanation. However, the study makes no attempt to solve the more fundamental aspect of the problem which is to determine definitely the nature of the various phenomena which are causing these sightings, or to discover means by which these causes and their visual and electronic effects may be immediately identified. Our consultant panel stated that these solutions would probably be found on the margins or just beyond the frontiers of our present phenomena, with the added possibility that our present dispersal of nuclear waste products might also be a factor. The recommended that a study group be formed to perform three functions:
(1) Analyze and systematize the factors of information which form the fundamental problem ;
(2) Determine the fields of fundamental science which must be investigated in order to reach an understanding of the phenomena involved; and
(3) Make recommendations for the initiation of appropriate
research.
Dr. Julius A. Stratton, Vice President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has indicated to OSI that such a group could be constituted at that Institute. Similarly, Project Lincoln, the Air force air defense project at MIT, could be charged with these responsibilities.
4. CONCLUSION
a. The flying saucer situation contains two elements of danger which, in
a situation of international tension, have national security
implications.
These are :
(1) Psychological - With word-wide sightings reported, it was found that, up to the
time of our investigation, there had been in the Russian press no report or comment, even satirical, on flying saucers, though Andre Gromyko had made one humorous mention of the subject. With a State-controlled press, this could result only from an official policy decision. The question, therefore, arises as whether or not these sightings:
(a) Could be controlled,
(b) Could be predicted, and
(c) Could be used from a psychological warfare point of view either
offensively or defensively.
The public concern with the phenomena, which is reflected in the United States press and in pressure of inquiry upon the Air Force, indicates that there is a fair proportion of our population which is mentally conditioned to the acceptance of the incredible. In this fact lies the potential for the touching-off of mass hysteria and panic.
(2) Air Vulnerability - The United States Air Warning System will undoubtedly
always depend upon a combination of radar screening and visual observation. We give Russia the present capability of delivering an air attack against us, yet at any given moment now, there may be current a dozen official unidentified sightings plus many unofficial. At any moment of attack, we are now in a position where we cannot, on an instant basis, distinguish hardware from phantom, and as tension mounts we will run the increasing risk of false
alerts and the even greater danger of falsely identifying the real as phantom.
b. Both of these problems are primarily operational in nature but each contains readily apparent intelligence factors. From an operational point of view, three actions are required :
(1) Immediate steps should be taken to improve identification of both visual and
electronic phantom so that in the event of an attack, instant and positive identification of enemy planes or missiles can be made.
(2) A study should be instituted to determine what, if any, utilization could be made of these phenomena by United States psychological warfare planners, and what, if any, defenses should be planned in anticipation of Soviet attempts to utilize them.
(3) A national policy should be established as to what should be told the public regarding the phenomena, in order to minimize risk of panic.
c. Intelligence problems include :
(1) The present level of Russian knowledge regarding these phenomena
(2) Possible Soviet intentions and capabilities to utilize these phenomena to the
detriment of US security interests.
(3) The reasons for silence in the Soviet Press regarding flying saucers.
d. Intelligence responsibilities in this field as regards both collection
and analysis can be discharged with maximum effectiveness only
after much more is known regarding the exact nature of these
phenomena.
e. The problem transcends the level of individual departmental
responsibilities, and is of such importance as to merit cognizance
and action by the National Security Council.
f. Additional research, differing in character and emphasis from that
presently being performed by Air Force, will be required to meet the
specific needs of both operations and intelligence.
5. RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that :
a. The Director of Central Intelligence advise the National Security Council of the security implications inherent in the flying saucer problem with the request that, under his statutory coordinating authority, The Director of Central Intelligence be empowered to institute through the appropriate agencies, either within or without the government, the investigation and research necessary to solve the problem of instant positive identification of "unidentified flying objects".
b. CIA, under its assigned responsibilities, and in cooperation with the psychological strategy board immediately investigate possible offensive or defensive utilization of the phenomena for psychological warfare purposes both for and against the United States, advising those agencies charged with U.S. internal security of any pertinent findings affecting their areas of responsibility.
c. On the basis of these programs of research, CIA develop and recommend for adoption by the National Security Council a policy of public information which will minimize the risk of panic.
H. MARSHALL CHADWELL
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence
OSI PGStrong:bxd (11 September 1952)
((((((((((((((((((((0))))))))))))))))))))
SECURITY INFORMATION
Sept. 24 1952
MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director (Intelligence)
SUBJECT : Flying Saucers
1. Recently an inquiry was conducted by the Office of Scientific Intelligence to determine Whether there are national security implications in the problem of "unidentified flying objects", i.e., flying saucers; whether adequate study and research is currently being directed to this problem in its relation to such national security implications; and what further investigation and research should be instituted, by whom, and under what aegis.
2. It was found that the only unit of Government currently studying the problem is the Directorate of Intelligence, USAF, which has charged the Air Technical Intelligence Center (ATIC) with responsibility for investigating the reports of sightings. At ATIC there is a group of three officers and two secretaries to which come, through official channels, all reports of sightings. This group conducts investigation of the reports, consulting as required with other Air Force and civilian technical personnel. A world-wide reporting system has been instituted and major Air Force Bases have been ordered to make interceptions of unidentified flying objects. The research is being conducted on a case basis and is designed to provide a satisfactory explanation of each individual sighting. ATIC has concluded an arrangement with Battelle Memorial Institute for the latter to establish a machine indexing system for official reports of sightings.
3. Since 1947, ATIC has received approximately 1500 official reports of sightings plus an enormous volume of letters, phone calls and press reports. During July 1952 alone, official reports totaled 250. Of the 1500 reports, Air Force carries 20 percent as unexplained and of those received January through July 1952 it carries 26 percent unexplained.
4. In its inquiry into this problem, a team from CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence consulted with a representative of Air Force Special Studies Group; discussed the problem with those in charge of the Air Force Project at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base; reviewed a considerable volume of intelligence reports; checked the Soviet press and broadcast indices; and conferred with three CIA consultants, who have broad knowledge of the technical areas concerned.
5. It was found that the ATIC study is probably valid if the purpose is limited to a case-by-case explanation. However, that study does not solve the more fundamental aspect of the problem. These aspects are to determine definitely the nature of the various phenomena which are causing these sightings, or to discover means by which these causes and their visual or electronic effects, may be identified immediately. The CIA consultants stated that these solutions would probably be found on the margins or just beyond the frontiers of our present knowledge in the fields of atmospheric, ionospheric, and extraterrestrial phenomena, with the added possibility that our present dispersal of nuclear waste products might also be a factor. The recommended that a study group be formed to perform three functions:
(a) Analyze and systematize the factors which constitute the fundamental
problem;
(b) Determine the fields of fundamental science which must be investigated in
order to reach an understanding of the phenomena involved; and
(c) Make recommendations for the initiation of appropriate research.
Dr. Julius A. Stratton, Vice President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has indicated to CIA that such a group could be constituted at that Institute. Similarly, Project Lincoln, the Air Force's air defense project at MIT, could be charged with some of these responsibilities.
6. The flying saucer situation contains two elements of danger which, in a situation of international tension, have national security implications.
These are:
(a) Psychological - With world-wide sightings reported, it was found that, up to the
time of the investigation, there had been in the Soviet press no report or comment, even satirical, on flying saucers, though Gromyko had made one humorous mention of the subject. With a State-controlled press, this could result only from an official policy decision. The question, therefore, arises as whether or not these sightings:
(1) Could be controlled,
(2) Could be predicted, and
(3) Could be used from a psychological warfare point of view either offensively
or defensively.
The public concern with the phenomena, which is reflected both in the United States press and in the pressure of inquiry upon the Air Force, indicates that a fair proportion of our population is mentally conditioned to the acceptance of the incredible. In this fact lies the potential for the touching-off of mass hysteria and panic.
(b) Air Vulnerability - The United States Air Warning System will undoubtedly
always depend upon a combination of radar screening and visual observation. The U.S.S.R. is credited with the present capability of delivering an air attack against the United States, yet at any given moment now, there may be current a dozen official unidentified sightings plus many unofficial ones. At any moment of attack, we are now in a position where we cannot, on an instant basis, distinguish hardware from phantom, and as tension mounts we
will run the increasing risk of false alerts and the even greater danger of falsely
identifying the real as phantom.
7. Both of these problems are primarily operational in nature but each contains readily apparent intelligence factors.
8. From an operational point of view, three actions are required:
(a) Immediate steps should be taken to improve identification of both visual and
electronic phantom so that in the event of an attack, instant and positive identification of enemy planes or missiles can be made.
(b) A study should be instituted to determine what, if any, utilization could be
made of these phenomena by United States psychological warfare planners and what, if any, defenses should be planned in anticipation of Soviet attempts to utilize them.
(c) In order to minimize risk of panic, a national policy should be established as to
what should be told the public regarding the phenomena,
9. Other intelligence problems which require determination are:
(a) The present level of Soviet knowledge regarding these phenomena
(b) Possible Soviet intentions and capabilities to utilize these phenomena to the
detriment of the United States security interests.
(c) The reasons for silence in the Soviet Press regarding flying saucers.
10. Additional research, differing in character and emphasis from that presently being performed by Air Force, will be required to meet the specific needs of both operations and intelligence. Intelligence responsibilities in this field as regards both collection and analysis can be discharged with maximum effectiveness only after much more is known regarding the exact nature of these phenomena.
11. I consider this problem to be of such importance that it should be brought to the attention of the National Security Council in order that a community-wide coordinated effort towards its solution may be initiated.
/s/ HM Chadwell
H. MARSHALL CHADWELL
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence
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SECURITY INFORMATION
Oct. 2 1952
MEMORANDUM TO: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Deputy Director (Intelligence)
FROM : Assistant Director, Office of Scientific Intelligence
SUBJECT : Flying Saucers
1. PROBLEM - To determine: (a) Whether or not there are national security implications in the problem of "unidentified flying objects"; (b) Whether or not adequate study and research is currently being directed to this problem in its relation to such national security implications; and (c) What further investigation and research should be instituted, by whom, and under what aegis.
2. FACTS AND DISCUSSION - OSI has investigated the work currently being performed on "flying saucers" and found that the Air Technical Intelligence Center, DI, USAF, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, is the only group devoting appreciable effort and study to this subject, that ATIC is concentrating on a case-by-case explanation of each report, and that this effort is not adequate to correlate, evaluate, and resolve the situation on an overall basis. The current problem is discussed in detail in TAB A.
3. CONCLUSIONS - "Flying saucers" pose two elements of danger which have national security implications. The first involves mass psychological considerations and the second concerns the vulnerability of the United States to air attack. Both factors are amplified in TAB A.
4. ACTION RECOMMENDED - (a) That the Director of Central Intelligence advise the National Security Council of the implications of the "flying saucer" problem and request that research be initiated. TAB B is a draft memorandum to the NSC, for the DCI's signature. (b) That the DCI discuss this subject with the Psychological Strategy Board. A memorandum to the Director, Psychological Strategy Board, is attached for signature as TAB C. (c) That CIA, with the cooperation of PSB and other interested departments and agencies, develop and recommend for adoption by the NSC a policy of public information which will minimize concern and possible panic resulting from the numerous sightings of unidentified objects.
/s/ HM Chadwell
H. MARSHALL CHADWELL
Assistant Director
Scientific Intelligence
ANNEXES:
TAB A - Memorandum to DCI, through DDI, Subject: Flying Saucers.
TAB B - Letter to National Security Council with enclosure.
TAB C - Memo to Director, Psychological Strategy Board with enclosure.
CONCURRENCES:
Date: _________________ ______________________
LOFTUS E. BECKER
Deputy Director/Intelligence
ACTION BY APPROVING AUTHORITY:
Date: _________________
Approved (disapproved)
_____________________
WALTER B. SMITH
Director
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SECURITY INFORMATION
13 Oct. 1952
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Intelligence)
SUBJECT : Flying Saucers
1. Flying unidentified objects (Flying Saucers) have been the subject of Air Force investigation and analysis because of the possibility that such objects might conceivably be an attack on the U.S. If they are not, it is conceivable that the enemy might take advantage of the confusion created by the [by the] Flying Saucers to use at his convenience some air weapon against the United States.
2. Thus far Defense Department conducted research in this area has been confined to the effort by A-2 through ATIC with the result that an explanation has been provided on all but 20 per cent of the total 1500 reported sightings of Flying Saucers.
3. Determination of the scientific capabilities of the USSR to create and control Flying Saucers as a weapon against the United States is a primary concern of the CIA/OSI. Its review of existing information does not lead to the conclusion that the saucers are USSR created or controlled. It is the view of OSI that collection of intelligence information on the capabilities of the USSR to produce, launch, and control Flying Saucers and the analysis of such data as might be collected cannot be very effective until there is adequate fundamental scientific research launched to clarify the nature and causes of Flying Saucers and to devise means whereby they might be instantly identified.
4. The major scientific intelligence problems in respect to saucers are:
a. What is the present level of Soviet knowledge regarding these phenomena?
b. What are possible Soviet capabilities to utilize these phenomena to the detriment of US security interests?
c. What effect do flying saucers have on our warning system.
5. Conclusions:
a. The instigation of fundamental scientific research is the primary responsibility of
the Defense Department.
{, after IAC,} {(alternatively: The NSC)}
b. The DCI ^ should dispatch to Secretary Lovett ^ along the lines of the attached.
The cover sheet explaining to the IAC why the proposed letter is submitted is also attached {(We showed
this draft & the idea with A-2 before IAC)}c. It is far too early in view of the present state of our knowledge regarding Flying
Saucers for psychological warfare planners to start planning how the United States might use U.S. Flying Saucers against the enemy.
d. When intelligence has submitted the National Estimate on Flying Saucers there
will be the time and basis for a public policy to reduce or restrain mass hysteria.
/s/ James Q. Reber
JAMES Q. REBER
Assistant Director
Intelligence Coordination
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SECURITY INFORMATION
DRAFT COVER SHEET
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Flying Unidentified Objects (Flying Saucers)
{(Alternatively: The NSC)}
1. Attached is proposed letter to Secretary Lovett ^ from the DCI recommending the initiation of fundamental scientific research with respect to the nature and causes of unidentified flying objects (Flying Saucers).
2. While it is recognized that the implications of Flying Saucers are of primary concern to the Defense Department in carrying out its responsibility to defend the United States, it is also believed that intelligence must request of appropriate authority such assistance as it needs to carry out its responsibility. It is believed that the scientific research required and the intelligence research contingent thereon can be most fruitful if they go hand in hand.
3. Recommendations:
a. That the IAC concur in the proposed letter to the secretary of Defense.
b. That the IAC request the Watch Committee to give close attention to indications which may reflect Russian actions are being taken with respect to or on the basis of cognizance of Flying Saucers or with respect to the state of United States public opinion in respect of Flying saucers.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
DRAFT LETTER
MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of Defense {(Alternatively: The NSC)}
SUBJECT: Unidentified Flying Objects (Flying Saucers)
1. The IAC has reviewed the current situation concerning unidentified flying objects which have caused extensive speculation in the press and have been the subject of concern to Government organizations. The Air Force, within the limitations of manpower which could be devoted to the subject, has thus far carried the full responsibility for investigating and analyzing individual reports of sightings. Since 1947, approximately 1500 official reports of sightings have been received and, of these, about 20% are as yet unexplained.
2. It is my view and that of the IAC that this situation has possible implications for our national security with respect to the vulnerability of the U.S. to air attack. Intelligence, however, cannot discharge its responsibilities with regard to estimating the capabilities of an enemy to create and use such phenomena against the U.S. unless we first determine through scientific research whether or not such phenomena can in fact be generated and controlled by humans.
3. It is therefore recommended, that the Department of Defense {(be directed to)} undertake an expanded scientific research program to reveal the nature of the various phenomena which are causing these sightings and means by which these phenomena may be identified immediately. It is also recommended that in such a project there be close cooperation between those conducting research and scientific and technical intelligence research. The IAC agencies are prepared to do their part in such a project.
4. It is therefore recommended, that this Agency and the agencies of the Department of Defense be directed to formulate and carry out a program of intelligence and research activities required to solve the problem of instant positive identification of unidentified flying objects. A draft of an appropriate directive is attached.
{DCI}
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SECURITY INFORMATION
14 October 1952
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Flying Saucers Problem
1. At an informal discussion between DD/I, AD/IC, and Acting AD/SI, it was agreed that the saucer problem should be attacked by getting together the responsible individuals in the community to work out a program of research and intelligence which can then be implemented by them directly. The agreed program can then be forwarded to the DCI and possibly the Secretary of Defense and the balance of the National Security Council as an established program rather than waiting for a great deal of formal, high level paper pushing before taking action.
2. DD/I directed Acting AD/SI to contact Dr. Whitman and Gen. Samford to arrange an appropriate time at which this problem can be reviewed. Acting AD/SI to call on Dr. Whitman and review the background of our study before the meeting.
3. Subsequently, Acting AD/SI was advised that the most convenient days for this meeting would be Monday or Tuesday, 20 or 21 October. Those present would be:
Dr. Walter G. Whitman, Chairman, RDB
Gen. John A. Samford, Director of Intelligence, USAF
Mr. Loftus E. Becker, DD/I
Mr. James Q. Reber, AD/IC
plus others deemed appropriate by the principals.
/s/ Ralph L. Clark
RALPH L. CLARK
CC: Chief, Opns/SI - 1
Chief, SAD/SI - 1
Chief, Prod/SI - 1
{22 aug request}
{L 141}
Suite… (.#432).- Documents UFOs of the C.I.A for Sept. and Oct. 1952, uncensored.
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